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COMMENT

WHEN CONSIDERING WHETHER PRIOR CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE IN SUBSEQUENT CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS AS A HEARSAY EXCEPTION, SHOULD
MARYLAND KEEP ITS KUHL OR TAKE A WALK ON THE

WALDSIDE?
By: Michael Rynd*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Assume that Usama Bin Ladin has been captured, tried, and
convicted for his role in participating in the murder of over 3,000
people. In wrongful death suits arising after the criminal judgment,
plaintiffs in federal court have the option under Federal Rule of
Evidence ("FRE") 803(22) of introducing the conviction "to prove any
1
fact essential to sustain the judgment." The Court of Appeals of
Maryland has considered proposals for, but declined to adopt, a rule of
evidence similar to FRE 803(22). 2 If this hypothetical situation played
out in Maryland state courts, the burden would exist for each
subsequent civil suit plaintiff to redraw, for the finder of fact, all facts
necessary to sustain Bin Ladin's culpability. Fully seventy-five
percent of states other than Maryland have adopted rules of evidence
substantially similar in language and intent to FRE 803(22). 3 On the
*
1.

2.
3.

J.D. expected May 2006, University of Baltimore School of Law.
FED. R. Evm. 803(22) ("Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment,
entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere),
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when
offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than
impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an
appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.").
LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 250 (2d ed. 2002).
ALA. R. Evm. 803(22); ARiz. REv. STAT. R. 803(22); ARK. R. EVID. 803(22); CAL. EVID.
CODE§ 1300; COLO. R. EVID. 803(22); DEL. R. EVID. 803(22); HAW. R. Evm. 803(22);
IDAHO R. EVID. 803(22); IND. R. EVID. 803(22); IOWA R. EVID. 5.803(22); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-460(r); KY. R. EVID. 803(22); LA. CODE EVID. art. 803(22); ME. R. EVID.
803(22); MICH. R. EVID. 803(22); MINN. R. EvrD. 803(22); MISS. R. EVID. 803(22);
MONT. R. EVID. 803(22); NEB. R. STAT.§ 27-803(21); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 51.295; N.J. R.
EVID. 803(22); N.M. R. Evm. ll-803V.; N.D. R. EviD. 803(22); OHIO R. EVID. 803(21);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2803(22); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.460(22); R.I. R. Evm. 803(22);

25
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question of admitting a prior criminal conviction as evidence in a
subsequent civil proceeding, Maryland has definitely not followed the
herd. 4
There is a tension between the desire for judicial economy and
fairness to persons injured by criminal activity on one hand, and the
need to protect traditional rights of all litigants on the other. Is a
modified version of FRE 803(22) the answer? This article posits that
the tension may be eased by emphasizing the judge's role as
gatekeeper, empowered to determine relevancy and materiality and to
balance probative value against prejudicial effect.
In order to understand the applicability of the proposed rule it is
imperative that it not be confused with established uses of criminal
convictions. Under Maryland law, a witness may be impeached by a
past conviction for an infamous crime or a crime that reflects
negatively on the witness' credibility for truthfulness. 5 A party's plea
of guilty may come into a subsequent proceeding as an admission of a
6
party opponent. It is essential to differentiate between proof of the
fact of the conviction, proof of which might be admissible as a public
record, 7 and the facts essential to sustain the conviction. FRE 803(22)
and its kin are not in place to say that Party A has been convicted of
arson (and therefore is a three-time loser), rather to show that Party A
set fire to his insured's building (and therefore invoked the
exclusionary clause regarding intentional acts in the policy).
It is helpful to retain three concepts while considering this topic.
First, there is a long-standing tradition that a criminal should not profit
from the fruits of his crime. It is a legitimate question to ask whether
the party, against whom the evidence might be offered, would in the
absence of a rule like FRE 803(22), benefit from forcing the offeror of
the evidence tore-litigate the underlying facts necessary to sustain the
conviction. Second, there is an equally long-standing tradition that the
party, against whom the evidence might be offered, is entitled to have
fully litigated all the underlying contentions. Third, nothing in the

4.

S.C. R. EVID. 803(22); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 19-16-26; TENN. R. EVID. 803(22); TEX.
R. Evm. 803(22); UTAH R. EVID. 803(22); VT. R. Evm. 803(22); WASH. R. EVID.
803(a)(22); W.VA. R. EVID. 803(22); WIS. STAT.§ 908.03(22); WYO. R. EVID. 803(22).
See Stephen B. Gerald, Comment: Judgments of Prior Conviction as Substantive Proof in

Subsequent Civil Proceedings: A Study of Admissibility and Maryland's Need for Such a
Hearsay Exception, 29 U. BALT. L. REV. 57 (1999); Stephen J. Karina, Ford v. Ford: A
Maryland Slayer's Statute is Long Overdue, 46 MD. L. REv. 501 (1987).
5.
6.
7.

MD. RULE 5-609 (a).
MD. RULE 5-803(a).
MD. RULE 5-803(b)(8)(A).

2006]

Admissibility Of Prior Convictions

27

FRE 803(22) rule places it beyond the twin threshold evaluations of
relevance and the balancing test of prejudicial effect against probative
value.
Part II of this comment will discuss the development of the law in
three areas: (a) Maryland's common law dealing with the topic; (b)
sample jurisdictions' applications of rules similar to FRE 803(22); and
(c) Maryland's existing statutory exceptions to the exclusionary
practice. Part III will identify the areas of concern raised in Maryland
courts and in the rule proposal process in Maryland regarding
admissibility of antecedent criminal convictions in subsequent civil
proceedings. Part IV will address the concerns raised. Part V will
propose a specific modified version of the rule.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXISTING LAW
Maryland case law has evolved so that a criminal conviction related
to a civil case may be proved to impeach the evidence of a party who
testifies inconsistently with facts that were necessary to the conviction
but not as substantive proof of those facts. Federal courts and a large
majority of states have followed the trend away from the former
majority rule of exclusion, towards admissibility of a conviction as
substantive evidence of facts necessary to sustain the judgment. Even
in Maryland, the legislature has created exceptions to the exclusionary
practice to allow antecedent convictions into subsequent civil
proceedings as substantive evidence.
A.

The Evolution of Maryland Case Law

The near century-old case of Mattingly v. Montgomery 8
foreshadowed the blending of issues that can occur when using
criminal convictions as evidence. In Mattingly, the central question
was whether the driver of a carriage, acting as an agent of the
defendant, had been negligent in the handling of his horse at a railroad
crossing. 9 The horse, frightened by locomotive air brakes, leaped
10
wildly forward, knocking the plaintiff to the ground. Appealing the
judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant took exception to the trial
court's admission of the evidence that the carriage driver had been
arrested and fined for driving too fast as a result of the same
8. 106 Md. 461, 68 A. 205 (1907).
9. I d. at 468, 62 A. at 207.
10. ld. at 465, 68 A. at 206.
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incident. 11 The court held admission of the evidence was proper as
"[t]he credibility of the witness was . . . directly in issue upon a
material point, and the fact proved tended to impair the weight of his
evidence, and was properly admitted without the production of the
12
record of conviction." As this line of cases developed, admissibility
for credibility was retained while admissibility to show facts necessary
to sustain the conviction fell by the wayside.
Two years after Mattingly the court revisited this discussion in
13
Strube was returning
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Strube.
home from a visit to a gypsy camp by way of tracks on a viaduct
owned by the defendant when he was assaulted by a private detective
14
The railroad's agent, McCarron,
in the employ of the defendant.
testified on cross-examination that he had been convicted for beating
15
The appellate court considered the admissibility of this
Strube.
testimony. Citing Mattingly as directly on point, the court said "[t]he
answer affects the weight of McCarron's testimony as to the character
16
of the assault, and therefore in a sense his credibility as a witness."
The court appears to be looking at the facts underlying the conviction
but limiting the scope of the testimony by applying those facts to make
a determination regarding the witness's credibility.
The court's reluctance to make use of a judgment as substantive
evidence of the underlying facts continued to become more firmly
entrenched across the subsequent decades in a line of cases whose
authority for this approach was Strube. 17 In 1983, the court firmly
18
reiterated this position in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Kuhl.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

/d. at 471, 68 A. at 208.
!d. (emphasis added).
111 Md. 119, 73 A. 697 (1909).
!d. at 122, 73 A. at 698.
!d. at 125, 73 A. at 699.
!d. at 126, 73 A. at 699 (emphasis added).
See Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 86, 698 A.2d 1097, 1104 (1997) ("A criminal
conviction is not conclusive of the facts behind it in a subsequent civil proceeding, and,
indeed, the conviction is ordinarily not even admissible in the civil action as evidence of
the underlying facts."); Eisenhower v. Baltimore Transit Co., 190 Md. 528, 538, 59 A.2d
313, 319 ( 1948) ("[T]he judgment in a criminal prosecution is not competent
evidence, to establish the truth of the facts upon which it has been rendered, in a civil
action for damages occasioned by the offense of which the party stands convicted.");
Gen. Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. I, 7, 165 A. 809, 811 (1933) (fmding that the
case before it was "within the general rule that the judgment in the criminal prosecution
is not competent evidence, to establish the truth of the facts upon which it has been
rendered, in a civil action for damages occasioned by the offense of which the party
stands convicted.").
18. 296 Md. 446, 450,463 A.2d 822, 825 (1983).
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While Kuhl is convoluted both factually and procedurally, the thrust of
the court's opinions regarding the subject at hand is clear. The central
factual issue was whether the insured driver had deliberately struck the
19
victims with the vehicle he was operating.
Kuhl was one of several hitchhikers picked u~ by car salesman,
Leonard Prahl, on a late night trip to the beach. 2 After a roadside
argument, Prahl briefly deserted his former riders?' Subsequently,
Kuhl and a companion were struck by the company vehicle Prahl was
22
Prahl signed a written statement admitting striking the
driving.
23
pedestrians, but asserted that it had been an accident.
Prahl was
convicted in the District Court of Maryland for Dorchester County of
24
assault and battery.
Kuhl and the other victim sued Prahl and his employer in the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County? 5 While that suit was
pending, the insurer filed a declaratory judgment action in the same
26
court. At issue in the declaratory judgment action was whether Prahl
had intended to strike the victims, thereby negating the coverage. 27 A
jury found for the insurer? 8 On appeal of the declaratory judgment,
the Court of Special Appeals reversed and remanded finding that the
trial court improperly admitted the prior conviction of assault and
battery? 9 The insurer petitioned for certiorari and the victims filed an
answer and a conditional cross-petition? 0 The Court of Appeals
31
affirmed the judgment of the appellate court.
The Court of Appeals held the trial court had improperly admitted
2
the evidence of Prahl's conviction? The court noted the "well-settled
rule in Maryland that a criminal conviction is inadmissible to establish
the truth of the facts upon which it is rendered in a civil action for

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

/d. at 450,463 A.2d at 825.
/d. at 448, 463 A.2d at 824.
/d. at 448, 463 A.2d at 824.
/d. at 449, 463 A.2d at 824.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
ld at 450, 463 A.2d at 825.
/d.
/d.
/d.
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damages arising from the offense for which the person is convicted."
The court explained:

33

The reasons for this exclusion of the judgment in a
criminal case as evidence of the plaintiffs claim
against the traverser are various. There is a weighty
difference in the parties, objects, issues, procedure, and
results in the two proceedings with different rules with
respect to the competency of the witnesses and the
relevancy, materiality, and weight of the testimony. In
a civil proceeding, the act complained of is the essential
element, but in a criminal prosecution it is the intent
with which the act is done. 34
Kuhl remains effective today for the premise that a judgment is not
admissible as evidence of the facts necessary to sustain the
conviction. 35 The application of FRE 803(22) and similarly derived
rules of evidence in other jurisdictions fairly raises the question of
whether Maryland's dogged adherence to this particular aspect of the
common law is the most efficacious approach to evidence of a prior
judgment.

An interesting counterpoint to the weight of these decisions is the
1931 case of the allegedly philandering Baltimore baker, Wald v.
Wald. 36 In Wald the trial court was called upon to reconcile
disharmonious testimony regarding the plight of the Walds'
37
The underlying premise of both parties was that the
relationship.
other had abandoned the marital relationship. 38 The husband initiated
the action by filing a bill for absolute divorce and Mrs. Wald
responded with a cross-bill for permanent alimony. 39 On appeal, in
light of the contradictory testimony, the appellate court relied on "one
independent, decisive, and undisputed corroborative fact which is
40
convincing proof of the guilt of the husband." Mr. Wald had been
33. !d. at 450, 463 A.2d at 825. (citing Eisenhower v. Bait. Transit Co., 190 Md. 528, 59
A.2d 313 (1948); Galusca v. Dodd, 189 Md. 666, 57 A.2d 313 (1948); Gen. Exch. Ins.
Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. 1, 165 A. 809 (1933); Pugaczeweka v. Maszko, 163 Md. 355,
163 A. 205 (1932); Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Strube, Ill Md. 119, 73 A. 697 (1909)).
34. !d. at 450-51,463 A.2d at 825 (quoting Gen'l Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. 1, 165
A. 809, at 811 (1933) (citing Wharton's Criminal Evidence§§ 570-570d (lOthed.)).
35. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Carter, !54 Md. App. 400,409, 840 A.2d 161, 167 (2003).
36. 161 Md. 493, 159 A. 97 (1931).
37. /d.at495,159A.at98.
38. !d. at 495-96, !59 A. 98-99.
39. !d. at 495, 159 A. at 98.
40. !d. at 497, 159 A. at 99.
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convicted of desertion and non-support on more than one occasion.
The court held the "repeated judgments are convincing evidence of the
42
husband's wrongful abandonment of the wife."
The Kuhl court distinguished Waid when the insurer cited the case,
noting only that there had been no objection raised to the testimony of
43
the convictions at the original Wald trial.
Regarding the lack of
objection, the Wald appellate court said "the testimony must be given
its effect, which is clearly that the husband was prosecuted for
44
desertion, accompanied by non-support, of the wife." The appellate
Wald court, noting the absence of an objection, made equitable use of
the facts underlying the judgment in order to arrive at a fair solution.45
The steady track in Maryland case law, apart from Wald, may be
contrasted with dissimilar developments in other jurisdictions.
B.

A Sampling of Other Jurisdictions

The cases discussed below illustrate how other jurisdictions have
justified the alternative approach. Case law permitting evidence of
prior judgments has not only been used for the inferences available
about the underlying facts necessary to sustain a conviction, but also to
conclusive effect regarding the specific issues presented. FRE 803(22),
other similar rules, and the proposed rule outlined below, do not go
that far. Rather the intent of these rules remains to introduce the prior
judgment as evidence to assist the trier-of-fact in making a
determination regarding the issues whose relevance encompasses both
proceedings.
An early entry in the trend towards admissibility may be found in
the 1927 Virginia decision of Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins.
46
Co. v. Heller.
In Heller the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
the issue of whether a criminal conviction for arson could be used in a
subsequent civil proceeding as evidence against the convicted
47
The insurance company was the defendant in an action
insured.
48
brought by Heller to enforce his policy. The trial court, in line with
the common law of the day, held that the prior conviction was of no
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

ld at 498, 159 A. at 99.
ld
Kuhl, 296 Md. at 451, 463 A.2d at 825 (1983).
Wald, 161 Md. at 498, !59 A. at 99 (1931 ).
ld at 498, 159 A. at 99.
140 S.E. 314 (Va. 1927).
Id at 315.
ld
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49

consequence for the jury hearing the civil case.
On appeal, the
50
Virginia Supreme Court reversed. The court found relevance in the
judicially determined "fact of guilt" especially when "it is also the
51
precise fact in issue in the civil case." The court stated that "rigid
adherence to a general rule and to some judicial expressions would be
52
a reproach to the administration of justice."
In reaching its
conclusion,the court addressed many questions that continue to be
54
raised today, including differing burdens of proof, 53 mutuality, and
the fullness of the prior litigation. 55 The court held that logic, fairness,
and public policy all argued for giving the prior conviction conclusive
effect. 56
In a pre-Federal Rules of Evidence decision in Connecticut Fire
57
Ins. Co. v. Farrara, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit addressed: "whether or not a criminal conviction may
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

/d.at315.
/d. at 323.
/d.at316.
/d. at 315.
See id. at 316 ("It is perfectly logical to hold in such cases that if the offender has been
acquitted in the criminal prosecution, that acquittal should not bind another party who,
for a personal injury arising out of the same occurrence, seeks redress in a civil action;
and this because the prosecution may have failed merely because the guilt of the accused
was not proved beyond any reasonable doubt. As has been frequently said, the acquittal
of one accused of crime is only a finding that his guilt has not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. This reason, however, seems to fail where there is a conviction, and the
fact of guilt (when it is also the precise fact in issue in the civil case) has been judicially
determined, because the plaintiff in the civil action is only bound to prove that fact by a
preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, as the greater includes the less, we can see no
logical reason, considering the question from this point of view, why the conviction
should not be admissible, certainly as relevant evidence for the consideration of the
jury.").
See id. ("[T]he same rule of exclusion applies to convictions as to acquittals, the reason
given being that the parties not being the same there is the consequent lack of mutuality.
[citations omitted]. It is certainly clear in such cases that the plaintiff who is seeking
redress in tJ-.~ civil case for the injury, not having been a party to the criminal
prosecution, is not bound by its result. We confess our inability to perceive, however,
why the accused person himself should not be held either as bound or affected by the
result of the prosecution, if adverse to him.").
See id. ("He has had his day in court, with the opportunity to produce his witnesses, to
examine and cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, and to appeal from the
judgment.").
See id. at 321 ("The rule of exclusion is a shield for the protection of those who have had
no opportunity to assert their defense. To apply it here would be to convert it into a
sword in the hands of one who has had such an opportunity, to be used by him for the
effectuation of the same fraud which has been established, condemned and punished in
the criminal case. If there be a rule which cannot stand the test of reason, it is a bad
rule.").
277 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1960).
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be considered in a subsequent civil proceeding for the purpose of
establishing the truth of the facts upon which it was based." 58 Farrara
arose from an incident in Missouri and dealt with an insured's claim in
federal district court for benefits from two policies written on property
which the insured had been convicted of burning. 59 The insurers filed
a declaratory action regarding their liability in the federal court at the
same time the insured attempted to recover on the policies in state
60
court.
The state civil suit was consolidated in federal court with the
61
declaratory action.
Because the insurers raised the conviction on
cross-examination while the prior criminal judgment was being
appealed, the district court initially found for the insured. 62 When the
insured's conviction was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court, the
msurer sought to revisit the matter. 63
0

0

0

The federal court noted the common law of Missouri had held that
a criminal judgment could not be used "in a subsequent civil
proceeding for the purpose of establishing the truth of the facts upon
64
which it was based."
The Court of Appeals looked to other
jurisdictions that had expressed traditional concerns such as that "civil
proceedings differ as to the issues, objects and procedures involved."65
The court distinguished the instant case from the common law
tradition by citing the fact that the insured had instituted the action. 66
The court noted strong public policy arguments for the twin
propositions that criminals should not benefit from the fruits of their
crimes and that to hold otherwise would diminish confidence in the
67
judicial process. The court also addressed the weight to be given the
evidence. The court found the conviction affirmed by the Missouri
Supreme Court to not only be admissible, but to be conclusive, so that
68
there was no need tore-litigate the insured's culpability.
!d. at 390.
/d. at 389 (citing State v. Farrara, 320 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1958)).
Id at 389.
/d.
!d.
Id at 389-90.
/d. at 390 (citations omitted).
Id (citing W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Conviction or Acquittal as Evidence of the Facts on
Which it Was Based in Civil Action, 18 A.L.R.2D 1287 (1951)).
66. /d. at 390.
67. /d. at 390-92. It is the opinion of the author that both arguments lend credence to the
position that the proposed rule is fairly applicable even in circumstances where the
convicted party has not instituted the action.
68. !d. at 392. (holding "if public policy demands that a criminal be not allowed to profit by
his crime and considering the fact that the criminal judgment was based upon a burden of

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

34
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A similar result, affording a conviction conclusive effect, was
reached in Arkansas, despite a common law tradition similar to
69
Maryland's and Missouri's. In Zinger v. Terrel/, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas "effectively overruled Arkansas' common law position
that a judgment in a criminal prosecution was not admissible in a
70
subsequent civil suit to prove the facts upon which it was based."
Zinger, already convicted of murdering her mother, sought review of
a grant of summary judgment in favor of Terrell, the administratrix of
71
the victim's estate. The trial court held, and the Arkansas Supreme
Court affirmed, that Zinger's conviction precluded her claim to any
72
life insurance proceeds from her mother's estate.
The Arkansas
Supreme Court cited the enhanced rights of criminal defendants as part
73
of the rationale justifying a break with the common law. The court
74
went on to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel and held that "a
defendant who has been adjudged guilty of murdering a person is
collaterally estopped from re-litigating that same issue in a later civil
75
proceeding to inherit or take the victim's property."

69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.

75.

proof requiring guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, there seems little justification for
allowing the civil tribunal to reach a conclusion inconsistent with that policy. The facts
of this case are such, however, that it is unnecessary for us to decide this issue. The
opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Ferrara reveals clearly that the
evidence adduced at the criminal proceeding was fully as complete as that presented in
this action. No basis for a collateral attack on the validity of that judgment appears.
Thus, even accepting the majority rule that a criminal conviction is only additional
evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding, we hold in this case that any conclusion of the
finder of fact, having been apprised of this conviction, that this fire was not due to the act
and design of the insured would be unsupported by substantial evidence and would
demand reversal by us.").
985 S.W.2d 737 (Ark. 1999).
Ray B. Schlegel, Case Note: Zinger v. Terrell: The Collateral Estoppel Effect of
Criminal Judgments in Subsequent Civil Litigation: New Law in Arkansas and the
Questions Unanswered, 54 ARK. L. REV. 127 (2001).
Zinger, 985 S.W.2d at 738 (Ark. 1999).
!d.
!d. at 740.
!d. at 741 ("The doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion bars there-litigation of
issues of law or fact actually litigated by the parties in the first suit, provided that the
party against whom the earlier decision is being asserted has a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in question and that issue is essential to the judgment (citations omitted).
The following elements must be shown in order to establish collateral estoppel: (I) the
issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior litigation; (2)
the issue must have been actually litigated; (3) the issue must have been determined by a
final and valid judgment; and (4) the issue must have been essential to the judgment
(citations omitted). We hold that a defendant who has been adjudged guilty of murdering
a person is collaterally estopped from re-litigating that same issue in a later civil
proceeding to inherit or take the victim's property.").
Id. at 741.
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There are several recurring themes in these cases. All three broke
from the common law, due to public policy arguments based on
fairness, logic, and evolving judicial doctrines. 76 In each case, the
prior conviction had a conclusive effect in the subsequent civil
proceeding. 77 The proposed rule, like its existing counterparts, is not
intended to inevitably preclude rebuttal.
78

In Gines- Vega v. Crowley American Transport, Inc., the United
States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico considered the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment grounded on a conviction
held to be admissible under FRE 803(22). 79 In Gines- Vega, a civil suit
followed a multi-vehicle accident resulting in the death of four
80
people.
The driver of the tractor, hauling the trailer owned by
Crowley, pled guilty and was convicted of four counts of involuntary
manslaughter. 81 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
convictions were determinative on the issue of negligence stating, "To
admit the evidence is not, however, to render it conclusive of the
82
question of liability." The court affirmed the intent behind the rule
that the parties against whom the evidence is offered have the
opportunity "[t]o rebut such evidence by offering whatever
explanation there may be concerning either the circumstances
surrounding the conviction or the underlying event. ... The ultimate
weight to be afforded to evidence of conviction is for the trier of fact
83
to determine." Given the weight of the evidence, the effect is
appropriately delegated to the trier of fact. While circumstance may
result in a preclusive effect, the result of admitting a conviction is not
predetermined by the proposed rule.
C.

Existing Maryland Exceptions to the Exclusionary Practice

For similar public policy reasons, the Maryland legislature has
given criminal convictions an effect in subsequent civil proceedings
across a wide range of circumstances in Maryland. These include the
following circumstances whereby the common law slayer's rule might
76. See Heller, 140 S.E. 314 (Va. 1927); Farrara, 277 F.2d 388 (81h Cir. 1960); Zinger, 985
S.W.2d 737 (Ark. 1999).
77. Id.
78. 178 F.R.D. 351 (P.R. 1981).
79. Jd. at 355.
80. Jd. at 351.
81. Jd. at 353.
82. Jd. at 355.
83. Jd. (quoting MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6773, at 492
(1997)).

36

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 36

84

previously have been invoked; a disciplinary action before the
Attorney Grievance Commission related to criminal activity giving
85
rise to the petition for discipline; third party actions by victims of
86
defendants convicted of violations of anti-trust law; and actions
before the State Ethics Commission regarding a criminal conviction in
87
connection with lobbying activities.
Additionally, a criminal
conviction of another may be offered as exculpatory substantive
evidence by a defendant where the crime is of the nature that only one
actor could have committed the offense. 88 The various statutes are
motivated by concerns of fairness, integrity of criminal convictions,
easing the burden on the litigants, and enhancing the impact of the
conviction. 89 The weight of the prior convictions is generally of
90
greater impact than mere admissibility as evidence.
The language
used offers the convictions conclusive effect resulting in a form of
collateral estoppel applied to the underlying issues. 91
The statutory response enhancing Maryland's common law slayer's
rule was accomplished when the legislature responded to a frustrating
judicial conundrum. 92 James Finneyfrock murdered his parents, was
convicted of the crimes, then sued the family estate for benefits from
the victims' insurance. 93 Common law prevented Finneyfrock's
conviction from being offered into evidence in the subsequent civil
94
trial as proof of the central issue of Finneyfrock's culpability. The
bare logic of the circumstances prompted the General Assembly to
act. 95 The result was statutory leave for the courts to admit prior
96
convictions as conclusive evidence in slayer's rule cases.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

92.

93.
94.
95.
96.

See infra text accompanying notes 92-96.
See infra text accompanying notes 97-Ill.
See infra text accompanying notes 112-122.
See infra text accompanying notes 123-126.
See infra text accompanying notes 127-132.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 92-132.
/d.
/d.
See Memorandum from Lynn McLain on Court of Appeals Hearing on 141'1 Report of
the Rules Committee: Proposed Evidence Rules 5-803(b)(22) and Committee Note to
Rule 5-702 (Dec. 11, 1998) [hereinafter Memorandum on 141 st Report of the Rules
Committee) (on file with author).
/d.
/d.
/d.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-919 (2005).
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Maryland Rule 16-711 (g) gives conclusive weight to prior criminal
convictions when adjudicating petitions for disciplinary action related
to criminal conduct by an attorney. 97 The effect is the same regardless
of whether the conviction results from a verdict at trial, a guilty plea,
or a plea of nolo contendere. 98
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mandel, 99 the court applied
the predecessor to the current rule to conclusive effect. The Court of
Appeals held "in disciplinary matters a final judgment by a judicial
tribunal in another proceeding convicting an attorney of a crime is
conclusive proof of the guilt of the attorney of that crime." 100 The
respondent, former Maryland governor Marvin Mandel, was convicted
after a federal trial, of mail fraud and racketeering. 101 In response to a
challenge to the underlying conviction, the state court noted the
respondent's guilt had been established beyond a reasonable doubt and
that there was no constitutional mandate tore-litigate the issue. 102 The
court also noted there was no preclusion of evidence of mitigating
. . 1"mary heanng.
. 103
f:actors at the subsequent dtsctp
104

In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Tayback, the rule factored
into an attorney's suspension from the practice of law following his
guilty plea for willful failure to file income tax returns. The Court of
Appeals held that the guilty plea prevented the respondent from
105
The Court noted that the
asserting that his actions were not willfu1.
integrity of a criminal conviction is a factor that "cannot be attacked in

97. MD. RULE 16-771 (g) ("Conclusive effect of final conviction of crime. In any proceeding
under this Chapter, a final judgment of any court of record convicting an attorney of a
crime, whether the conviction resulted from a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a verdict
after trial, is conclusive evidence of the guilt of the attorney of that crime. As used in
this Rule, "final judgment" means a judgment as to which all rights to direct appellate
review have been exhausted. The introduction of the judgment does not preclude the
Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing additional evidence or the attorney from
introducing evidence or otherwise showing cause why no discipline should be
imposed.").
98. !d.
99. Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Mandel, 294 Md. 560, 571,451 A.2d 910, 915 (1982)
(applying MD. Rule BVIO e 1).
100. /d. at 569, 451 A.2d at 914.
101. /d. at 562-63, 451 A.2d at 911.
102. See id. at 571-72, 451 A.2d at 915-16 (quoting Md. State Bar Ass'n v. Rosenberg, 273
Md. 351, 354-55, 328 A.2d 106, 108 (1972) (applying MD. RULE BV4 f 1)).
103./d.
104. 378 Md. 578, 590, 837 A.2d 158,165 (2003) (citing Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Barnes,
286 Md. 474,487, 408 A.2d 719, 722 (1979)).
105. !d.
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a disciplinary proceeding by invoking this Court to re-weigh or to re106
evaluate the respondent's guilt or innocence."
107

In Maryland State Bar Ass 'n. v. Agnew,
both the Court and the
defendant recognized a plea of nolo contendere as "conclusive proof
108
of his guilt of the crime charged."
Following a nolo contendere
plea to a felony charge of willfully filing a fraudulent income tax
return, Agnew unsuccessfully argued against the recommendation of a
109
three-judge panel that he be disbarred.
The Court gave the plea full
weight as evidence of a crime involving moral turpitude and
constituting "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice." 110
111
Agnew was disbarred.
When a civil proceeding arises from the same events that resulted
in a prior criminal conviction, the plaintiff frequently replaces the state
as the adversary of the defendant in the civil action. Lack of mutuality
is frequently mentioned as a factor weighing against admission of
prior convictions as evidence in subsequent civil proceedings. 112 The
Maryland legislature has set aside mutuality concerns by providing
that a criminal conviction for violations of the anti-trust laws may be
considered "prima facie evidence against the defendant in an action for
113
damages brought by another party."
By legislative intent, 114 the
115
By the plain
Maryland statute parallels the federal antitrust law.
106. Tayback, 378 Md. at 590, 837 A.2d at 165 (quoting Bar Ass'n of Bait. City v. Siegel, 275
Md. 521, 527, 340 A.2d 710, 713 (1975)).
107.271 Md. 543,318 A.2d 811 (1974).
108./d. at 548,318 A.2d at 814.
109./d.
110./d. at 547,318 A.2d at 813.
Ill. /d. at 553-54, 318 A.2d at 817.
112. See supra text accompanying note 34.
113. Mo. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW § 11-210 (2003) ("Judgment as evidence. (a) In general. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a final judgment or decree rendered
in a criminal proceeding or civil action brought by the Attorney General under this
subtitle to the effect that a defendant has violated this subtitle is prima facie evidence
against the defendant in an action for damages brought by another party against him
under § 11-209(b) with respect to all matters where the judgment or decree would be an
estoppel
between
the
parties
to
it.
(b) Exception. - This section does not apply to a civil consent judgment or decree entered
before any testimony is taken.").
114. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Burch, 29 Md. App. 430,436, 349 A.2d 279,283 (1975) ("It is the
intent of the General Assembly that in construing the Maryland Antitrust Act courts be
guided by the interpretation given by the federal courts to federal antitrust acts.").
115. 15 U.S.C.S. § 16. ("Judgments. (a) Prima facie evidence; collateral estoppel. A final
judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding
brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a
defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in
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language of both federal and Maryland statutes, third parties may
116
benefit from a collateral estoppel effect of a prior judgment.
117

Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors is illustrative ofboth the
intent behind the federal statute and a broad reading of the weight of
the conviction in a subsequent proceeding. In Emich, the court
considered whether evidence of a prior criminal conviction for
restraint of trade was properly admitted in a subsequent civil
118
proceeding for damages resulting from the criminal behavior.
Respondents General Motors and General Motors Acceptance
Corporation had applied questionable practices in an effort to force
119
The court noted a goal
dealerships to promote financing revenue.
of the statute was to "minimize the burdens of litigation for injured
private suitors by making available to them all matters previously
120
In evaluating
established by the Government in antitrust actions."
the appropriate use of the conviction by the trial court, the court said:

The evidentiary use which may be made under § 5 of
the prior conviction of respondents is thus to be
determined by reference to the general doctrine of
estoppel. . . . Accordingly, we think plaintiffs are
entitled to introduce the prior judgment to establish
prima facie all matters of fact and law necessarily
decided by the conviction and the verdict on which it
was based. 121
In remanding the case, the court placed the burden on and the
discretion with the civil trial judge to examine the record of the

any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said
laws as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as
between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent
judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken. Nothing contained in
this section shall be construed to impose any limitation on the application of collateral
estoppel, except that, in any action or proceeding brought under the antitrust laws,
collateral estoppel effect shall not be given to any finding made by the Federal Trade
Commission under the antitrust laws or under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (15 U.S.C.S. § 45] which could give rise to a claim for relief under the antitrust
laws.") (brackets in original).
116. See supra notes 97 & 99.
117.340 u.s. 558 (1951).
118. /d. at 559.
119. !d.
120. !d. at 568 (citing H.R. REP. No. 627 (1914); S. REP. No. 698 (1914); 51 CONG. REc. 9270,
9490, 13851 (1914)).
121. !d. at 568-69.
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antecedent case and utilize jury instructions in arriving at a
122
detennination of the issues decided by the prior judgment.
Under Maryland law, the state agency empowered to regulate
lobbying activities may suspend an individual's registration as a
lobbyist if the lobbyist "has been convicted of a criminal offense
123
arising from lobbying activities."
By the language of the statute,
the actions of the State Ethics Commission may be taken following a
detennination of the nature of the underlying issues of the conviction
124
in their relationship to lobbying activities.
The facts underlying the
conviction are not re-litigated. The Commission merely accepts the
detennination of the earlier judgment. In State Ethics Commission v.
125
Evans,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that the use of a
prior conviction under the statute would further the purpose of
126
promoting the Commission's regulatory powers.
Finally, the Maryland legislature has said that a prior conviction of
a third party may be offered by a defendant in the circumstance where
127
only one actor could have committed the offense.
The purpose
128
In Joynes, two
behind the statute was described in State v. Joynes.
neighborhood combatants fought over loud music. Joynes' attempt to
introduce evidence of the neighbor's battery conviction was denied at
trial. 129 Joynes' counsel's intent was to use the neighbor's conviction
122. ld. at 571-72.
123. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T.15-405(e)(1)(2003).
124. Id. ("(1) If the Ethics Commission determines it necessary to protect the public interest
and the integrity of the governmental process, the Ethics Commission may issue an order
to: (i) suspend the registration of an individual regulated lobbyist if the Ethics
Commission
determines
that
the
individual
regulated
lobbyist:
1. has knowingly and willfully violated Subtitle 7 of this title; or
2. has been convicted of a criminal offense arising from lobbying activities; or
(ii) revoke the registration of an individual regulated lobbyist if the Ethics Commission
determines that, based on acts arising from lobbying activities, the individual regulated
lobbyist has been convicted of bribery, theft, or other crime involving moral turpitude.").
125. 382 Md. 370, 855 A.2d 364 (2004) (holding under the factual circumstances, the law,
which became effective Nov. 1, 2001, could not be applied retroactively).
126. Jd. at 365, 855 A.2d at 375 (describing the recommendations of the Study Commission
on Lobbyist Ethics, the body whose findings gave rise to the legislation, as "[A] number
of statutory changes designed to prohibit certain specific practices and provide greater
regulati •.m of lobbying activities and more effective enforcement of the regulatory
requirements.").
127. Mo. CODE ANN., CTs. & Juo. PROC. § 10-904 (2005) ("Proof of other's convictions. In a
civil or criminaL case in which a person is charged with commission of a crime or act,
evidence is admissible by the defendant to show that another person has been convicted
of committing the same crime or act.").
128. 314 Md. 113, 549 A.2d 380 (1988).
129. Jd. at 118, 549 A.2d at 382.
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as proof that Joynes was not the aggressor. 130 Ultimately, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the denial by the trial judge holding the statute did
not apply under the circumstances and that "because of the serial
nature of the altercation," it was reasonable to find that there may have
been more than one offense. 131 The statute would apply only to
preclude an obviously problematic result of convicting two parties of a
132
crime only one could have committed.
There exists a broad range of circumstances where judgments are
given a range of effects in Maryland. This raises the question of why
there is reluctance to eliminate the common law exclusionary practice.
III. RESERVATIONS IN MARYLAND REGARDING
ADMISSIBILITY
The Court of Appeals twice declined the recommendations of the
Court's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
133
Some
("Rules Committee") to adopt an 803(22)-type rule.
objections to the proposed rule stem from Maryland's case law while
additional reservations were articulated during the consideration of the
proposed evidence rules.
The Kuhl court, considered the admissibility of the judgment in a
criminal proceeding as evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding, and
identified as areas of concern the following differences between the
two proceedings: issues, procedure, results of the proceedings, rules
with respect to competency of the witnesses, and parties (raising the
134
concept of mutuality).
The court was also concerned with
"relevancy, materiality, and the weight of the testimony." 135 These
themes are consistent in Maryland appellate case law from 1933 136
through 2003. 137
The Court of Appeals also has considered the proposed rule change
in two separate public hearings. The first was conducted on October 4
and 5, 1993, when it considered adoption of Title 5 of the Maryland
130. ld.
131. Jd. at 121, 549 A.2d at 384-85.
132. Jd. at 121, 549 A.2d at 383-84 (citing Gray v. State, 221 Md. 286, 290, 157 A.2d 261,
264 ( 1990) (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 142
(3d ed. 1983)).
133. LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE STATE AND FEDERAL§ 803(22):1 (West 2002).
134. See supra note 34.
135.Jd.
136. Gen. Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. 1, 7, 165 A. 809, 811 (1933).
137. See supra note 35.
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Rules of Procedure as set forth in the Rules Committee's One Hundred
138
Twenty-Fifth Report to the Court.
The Court, by its order of
December 15, 1993, adopted Title 5 of the Maryland Rules as
recommended by the Rules committee, which has declined to include
139
Rule 803(22) in the recommendation.
During the second public
hearing on January 7, 1999, the court considered proposed rule
changes, including the recommendation to add 5-803(22) as set forth
in the Rules Committee's One Hundred and Forty-First Report to the
140
The court remanded the proposed rule to the Rules
Court.
141
Committee for further study.
The concerns of the court raised during the October, 1993 hearing
142
may be discerned from the audio tape of the proceeding.
The court
noted adoption of the proposed rule would result in a significant
143
departure from existing Maryland common law.
The court was
144
applying the rule when judgments
troubled by proposed language
145
were punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year.
Examples
of potential problems included the following: the effect of recidivist
statutes that enhanced penalties for repeat offenders (presumably
asking: Did this qualify as beyond the one year mark, if the underlying
crime, absent recidivism, would not?); when payment of a fine
resulted in a finding of guilt (presumably asking: Had the underlying
issue been fully litigated?); when a party made a technical guilty plea
with an agreed statement of facts (presumably asking: Was that party,
146
in fact, agreeing to the truth of these facts?).

138. 20 Md. Reg. I (July 23, 1993).
139.21 Md. Reg. I (Jan. 7, 1994).
140. 25 Md. Reg. 1745 (Nov. 20, 1998).
141. 26 Md. Reg. 263, 264 (Feb. 12, 1999).
142. Audio tape: Court of Appeals of Maryland Public Hearing to Consider the One Hundred
Twenty-Fifth Report of the Court's Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (Oct. 4-5, 1993) [hereinafter Hearing Audio Tape (1993)].
143. Hearing Audio Tape (1993), supra note 142.
144. Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure, !25th Report,
Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure: Evidence (Dec. 1993). ("Judgment of
Previous Conviction [Vacant], Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon
a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact
essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the State, in a
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons
other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown, but it does not
preclude admissibility. [There is no subsection 22.]").
145. Hearing Audio Tape (1993), supra note 139.
146. Hearing Audio Tape (1993), supra note 139.
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Prior to submitting the One Hundred Forty-First Report the Rules
Committee had several occasions to reconsider the proposed rule. It
came to the attention of the Rules Committee that several civil cases
involving the slayer's rule (prior to passage of Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
Code Ann. § 10-919) had recently been through the courts, creating an
147
opportune time to resubmit the proposed rule.
A revised rule was
adopted by the Rules Committee with the intent to resubmit the
148
proposed rule to the Court of Appeals.
A further change was made
to the proposed rule by adding a cross-reference when the slayer's rule
statute passed. 149
At a public hearing on January 7, 1999, the Court of Appeals
150
The court again
considered the newly proposed language.
expressed concern regarding the length of time required for potential
151
The
punishment of the criminal judgment before the rule kicked in.
court noted a discrepancy between what it perceived as the intent of
the federal rule (that is, the rule becomes effective upon punishment
for a felony) and the possible creeping effect of lesser crimes that
would come within the purview of the rule if sentences for minor
crimes, through statutory adjustment, resulted in enhanced sentences
beyond one year. 152 A question was raised regarding reconciling the
language of the rule with the need to demonstrate convictions of a
third party as an element of the crime with which the defendant was
charged (for example, cases of conspiracy or as an accessory before or
after the fact). 153 A further question was raised as to the standard of

147. Meeting Mins., Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure
39 (Nov. 21, 1997).
148. Meeting Mins., Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure
51 (Feb. 13, 1998).
149. Meeting Mins., Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure
61 (Sep. 11, 1998).
150. 25 Md. Reg. 1762 (Nov. 20, 1998) ("5-803(22) [Vacant] Judgment of Previous
Conviction. [There is no subsection 22.] Evidence of a final judgment entered after a
trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere) that adjudges a
person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
offered to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment. In criminal cases, the State
may not offer evidence of a judgment against persons other than the accused, except for
purposes of impeachment. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not
preclude admissibility.").
151. Audio tape: Court of Appeals of Maryland Public Hearing to Consider the One Hundred
Forty-First Report of the Court's Standing Committee on Rule of Practice and Procedure
(Jan. 7, 1999) [hereinafter: Hearing Audio Tape (1999)].
152. Hearing Audio Tape (1999), supra note 158.
153. Hearing Audio Tape (1999), supra note 158.
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154

finality of judgment as it applied to the proposed rule.
The court
elected to remand the proposal to the Rules Committee for
. o f the questions
.
. d. 155
cons1"derahon
raise
All the concerns raised, historically in the common law and
recently in the rule proposal process, deserve to be addressed. They
fall into five categories: 1) questions of differing issues, differing
parties and whether an issue is fully litigated; 2) questions of
relevancy, materiality, and weight of the evidence; 3) questions
regarding what triggers the application of the hearsay exception; 4)
questions regarding procedural issues, nature of the results,
competency; and 5) questions regarding the departure from the
common law.
IV. RESERVATIONS ADDRESSED

A.

Issues, Parties and the Fullness ofPrior Litigation

Questions of differing issues, differing parties and whether an issue
is fully litigated are best understood when viewed from the parallel
framework of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In a discussion of
collateral estoppel effects of judgments (a standard which should be
higher than the mere admission of evidence) within the broader
context of Maryland civil procedure, Professors Lynch and Bourne
have written, "It is difficult to see that any public policy is furthered
by permitting a wrongdoer to expend judicial resources re-litigating
156
what the state has already proved."
In effect, what the proponents of evidence under FRE 803(22)-type
rules would be attempting is a modified form of non-mutual offensive
collateral estoppel. A party that was not party to the first proceeding is
drawing on the antecedent action to offer evidence of facts necessarily
decided, in an effort to convince the trier of fact in the second
proceeding that there is no need to offer further proof of the
underlying issues. Nothing in the proposed rule bars the litigant
against whom the evidence is offered from challenging the evidence.
Collateral estoppel, in other circumstances, would of course bar the
litigation. The rule, however, allows the issue to enter into the
subsequent proceeding for, in the words of the Advisory Committee
154. Hearing Audio Tape (1999), supra note 158.
155. Hearing Audio Tape (1999), supra note 158.
!56. JOHN LYNCH & RICHARD BOURNE, MODERN MARYLAND
(2d ed. 2002).

CIVIL PROCEDURE§

12.3(d)(6)
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commenting on the federal rules, "what it is worth."
While not
every other state has adopted this view, nearly three out of every four
158
have.
The predicate circumstances that apply to a determination of
whether there is a valid collateral estoppel effect also may be applied
to a determination whether the facts necessary to sustain the
conviction should be permitted as evidence through the vehicle of
introducing the antecedent conviction in a subsequent proceeding.
The first necessary circumstance is that the "particular issue must have
159
been actually decided in the prior adjudication."
The second
circumstance is that "issue must have been an ultimate fact necessary
. th e pnor
. d ec1s10n
. . ,160
m
161

In Ferrell v. State,
the court conducted an extensive discussion
of collateral estoppel in light of the State's making a fourth attempt to
162
Judge
convict the same individual of a single armed robbery.
Eldridge, writing for the court, set a standard for determining whether
an issue was ripe for re-litigation based on a thorough examination of
163
the record of the prior proceeding.
Similarly, proper use of
proposed rule 5-803(22) would require the proponent of the conviction
as evidence to proffer that the facts the conviction was offered to
prove (1) were actually decided, (2) were necessary to the prior
conviction, and (3) are relevant to the subsequent civil proceeding.
The Colorado Court of Appeals, Division Five, found the existence
of Colorado Rule of Evidence 803(22) was an argument supporting a
finding of conclusive issue preclusion in A -1 Auto Repair & Detail,
164
Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy.
InA-1 Auto Repair, the court found identical
issues underlying the antecedent criminal case resulting in a
conviction for conversion and the subsequent civil proceeding
157. FED. Clv. Jun. PROC. & R. 454 (West 2005).
158. See supra note 3; but see N.H. R. Evm. 803 Reporter's Notes ("[T]he Committee
believes that the issue of whether to admit a judgment of prior conviction after a not
guilty plea is not one that should be addressed at the present time as a hearsay exception.
Rather, it depends on substantive principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata and
should be determined by the courts and/or the Legislature.").
159. Klein v. State, 52 Md. App. 640,648,452 A.2d 173, 178 n.3 (1982).
160. /d.
161.318 Md. 235,567 A.2d 937 (1990).
162. /d. at 239, 567 A.2d at 939 (explaining that double jeopardy became a factor only at
fourth trial: at first trial defendant was convicted on 5 of 8 counts but was granted a
motion for a new trial; second trial resulted in hung jury, third trial was declared a
mistrial).
163. /d. at 245-46, 567 A.2d at 942.
164. 93 P.3d 598, 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
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165

resulting from the same events.
The defendant in both actions had
been convicted of conversion of cash payments to her employer. 166
The court methodically evaluated the facts underlying the conviction
to determine whether issue had been actually litigated and was
necessary to the earlier proceeding, that there had been a judgment on
the merits, that Bilunas-Hardy was a party to the earlier proceeding,
167
Upon
and that she had had an opportunity to fully litigate the issue.
a determination that all the above factors were present in the earlier
proceeding, the court held the earlier conviction had conclusive effect
to the subsequent motion by the plaintiff in the civil trial for summary
168
judgment and affirmed the trial court's ruling for the plaintiff.
A-1
Auto Repair illustrates a methodology for a sound determination of
appropriate treatment of underlying issues.

B.

Relevancy and Prejudice

Questions of relevancy, materiality, and weight of the evidence all
169
(Definition of
fall readily under the superior rules of § 5-401
"Relevant Evidence") and § 5-403 170 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence
on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time) and may be
managed by the trial judge. The trial judge has existing rules at her
171
.
1 govemmg
.
. 1"tty, 172 and gtvmg
. .
h er the
re1evancy,
matena
dtsposa
173
power to weigh the probative value against the prejudicial effect.
74

In Kowalski v. Gagne/ the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit weighed the relevance of a murder conviction, as
evidence in a wrongful death suit for damages arising from the same
175
Defendant
event, against the prejudicial effect of the evidence.
165./d. at 602-03.
166. /d. at 600.
167. /d. at 602.
168. /d. at 602, 605.
169. Mo. RULE 5-401 (2004) ("Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
170. Mo. RULE 5-403 (2004) ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
171. Mo. RULE 5-401 (2004).
172. See LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 63 (2d ed. 2002) ("Rule 5-401
defines 'relevance' by collapsing common law relevance and materiality into one term.").
173. Mo. RULE 5-403 (2004).
174. 914 F.2d 299 (1st Cir. 1990).
175. /d. at 305.
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Gagne challenged the conviction's relevance as to damages in the civil
case and also contended that the prejudicial impact of the conviction
176
outweighed any probative value.
As to relevance, the court
concluded that because the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, it
was applying related damages to the degree of culpability, that it could
"think of few things more relevant to the question of culpability than a
defendant's conviction of second degree murder for the conduct that
caused the wrongful death. " 177 The court also dismissed the challenge
regarding prejudice, stating the lower court "properly could have
concluded that any prejudice caused by the evidence of defendant's
murder conviction was more than outweighed by the relevancy of the
evidence to the question of defendant's blameworthiness for the
k1'll'mg. ,178
The proposed rule yields to the threshold rules regarding relevancy
and prejudice. The proposed rule would admit the conviction merely
as evidence. The party against whom the conviction would be offered
has the same opportunity to challenge admissibility as applies to all
other forms of evidence.
C. Appropriate Sentencing Threshold to Trigger the Rule
Questions regarding what level of sentence triggers the application
of the hearsay exception may be resolved by examining the degree to
which the relevant issues are litigated in the prior criminal proceeding.
179
in adopting the
The proposed rule would join sixteen other states
language of the federal rule regarding the type of sentence that would
permit the conviction to be admissible as a hearsay exception. The
proposed rule thereby sets a standard that insures a high probability
that the criminal defendant will fully litigate the underlying issues. It
is essential that the party against whom the evidence is offered had
been fully motivated to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. The
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the earlier proceeding
legitimately allows the civil court to begin a balancing test as to the
weight of the evidence.
A criminal charge that may result in a sentence of one year or
longer (or death), sets a convenient departure point to presume that a
176. ld.
177. ld. at 306.
178. ld.
179. Ark., Colo., Haw., Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Mich., Minn., Miss., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.M.,
Ohio, Okla., Utah; see supra note 3.

48

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 36

defendant will make the utmost effort in his own defense. Under the
proposed rule, a first time conviction for sex offense in the fourth
degree would not be admissible in a subsequent civil suit by a
180
If, however, the defendant was a two-time loser for the
victim.
181
same offense, the second conviction would be admissible
to help
prove the facts essential to sustain the conviction in a subsequent suit.
Another example of an admissible conviction would be a conviction
for causing a life-threatening injury by vehicle while intoxicated. 182 A
conviction for driving under the influence, or under the influence per
se, second offense (and upwards) would be admissible. 183 Convictions
for driving under the influence, or under the influence per se, first
184
offense, or driving while impaired by alcohol, subsequent, 185 would
not fall within the rule. The proposed rule appropriately matches the
severity of its potential consequences with more egregious antecedent
circumstances.
Convictions resulting from means other than a trial should be given
effect proportionally to circumstances giving rise to the conviction. 186
An informed guilty plea is an acknowledgement of the existence of the
187
underlying facts.
Admissibility of a plea accompanied by an agreed
statement of facts should be reviewed under a "totality of the
circumstances" test which establishes that the plea has not been
188
motivated by exigencies forcing the hand of the pleader.
A plea of
nolo contendere should remain beyond the reach of the rule for the

180. Md. State Comm'n on Criminal Sentencing, Sentencing Guidelines Offense Table),
http://www.msccsp.org/guidelines/AppendixA-2005.pdf, 35 (classifying offense as a
misdemeanor, maximum punishment available: one year) (updated Mar. 28, 2005).
181. Id (classifying offense as a misdemeanor, maximum punishment available: three years).
182. Id (classifying offense as a misdemeanor, maximum punishment available: three years).
183. Id (classifying offense as a misdemeanor, maximum punishment available: two years).
184. Id (classifying offense as a misdemeanor, maximum punishment available: one year).
185. /d.
186. See, e.g., Briggeman v. Albert, 322 Md. 133, 136,586 A.2d 15, 16 (1991) ("The payment
of a traffic fine is neither a guilty plea nor an express acknowledgment of guilt; it is at
most a consent to conviction, closely analogous to a plea of nolo contendere.").
187. See Sutton v. State, 289 Md. 359,364,424 A.2d 755, 758 (1981). ("An acceptable guilty
plea is an admission of conduct that constitutes all the elements of a formal criminal
charge.").
188. See, e.g., Yanes v. State, 52 Md. App. 150, 448 A.2d 359 (1982) (reversing trial court's
conviction on a plea of not guilty with an agreed statement of facts, in part because the
trial court had not complied with then existing MD. RuLE 731 (c), predecessor to Mo.
RuLE 4-242, creating a liability for the defendant, who had in effect plead guilty to the
charge with no finding on the record that the defendant had been made aware of the
consequences.).
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simple reason that existence of the underlying facts will not have been
fully litigated. 189
D. Procedural Questions Resolved in Light of the Higher Burden
Placed on the Criminal Court

Questions regarding procedural issues, nature of the results, and
competency of witnesses, may be resolved by the higher burden of
proof in a criminal trial. Minnesota's Committee Notes accompanying
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 803(22) make the strong statement that
the rule "represents a belief in the trustworthiness of verdicts based on
the reasonable doubt standard." Also, the logic of the Supreme Court
of Virginia in Heller is compelling. Addressing the issue specifically
the Minnesota court indicated that the higher burden of proof lent
credence to utilization of the finding in a court with a lesser
standard. 190
The Colorado Court of Appeals, Fifth Division, in A-1 Auto Repair
articulates a strong argument for respecting the integrity of the
criminal judgment:
To preclude a civil litigant from re-litigating an issue
previously found against him in a criminal prosecution
is less severe than to preclude him from re-litigating
such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are
rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including
the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a
record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of
judgments and expeditious trials are served and no
injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped
from re-litigating issues determined in conformity with
these safegaurds. 191
189. See Thomas C. Hayden, Jr., Comment: The Plea of Nolo Contendere, 25 MD. L. REv.
227, 233 (1965) ("Although the plea acts as an admission of guilt for the purpose of the
case, it is uniformly recognized that the plea does not estop the defendant to deny the
facts upon which the prosecution was based in a subsequent civil suit.").
190. Heller, 140 S.E. at 316 (Va. 1927) ("This reason, however, seems to fail where there is a
conviction, and the fact of guilt (when it is also the precise fact in issue in the civil case)
has been judicially determined, because the plaintiff in the civil action is only bound to
prove that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, as the greater includes
the less, we can see no logical reason, considering the question from this point of view,
why the conviction should not be admissible, certainly as relevant evidence for the
consideration ofthejury.") (emphasis added).
191. A-1 Auto Repair, 93 P.3d at 601.
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Of course the rule proposed is not asking for the strict remedy of issue
preclusion. The logic that successfully argues for the more substantial
effect of a prior judgment certainly applies to a proposal for a lesser
effect of a previous conviction. The rule proposes a smaller brush in
the civil plaintiffs palette, but applied with the same standard of care.
E.

The Public Policy Argument for Changing the Common Law

Questions regarding the departure from the common law are best
answered from a public policy perspective. The Supreme Court of
192
Arkansas in Zinger found itself in the position that this article asks
the Court of Appeals to take. That position is to overrule a substantial
line of cases. It is within the power of the Court of Appeals to
establish an attainable standard for weighing the fairness and logic of
the slayer's rule on behalf of the plaintiffs while protecting a
defendant's rights through a rigorous multi-step evaluation of the prior
litigation, including the nature of the underlying issue, the extent to
which it was litigated, the probative value to the present litigation, and
the possibility of prejudicial effect. Adoption of the rule would bring
Maryland into accord with the vast majority of American jurisdictions.
V. PROPOSED RULE
The rule proposed by this article contemplates that the conviction is
admissible merely as evidence and subject to challenge by the party
against whom it is offered. Maryland should expand the admission of
criminal convictions in subsequent civil proceedings so as to be
considered as substantive proof of facts necessary to sustain the
conviction.
A.

Draft Rule Proposal

Judgment of a Previous Conviction.
Evidence of a final judgment entered after a trial or
upon a plea of guilty (but not a plea of nolo contendere)
that adjudges a person guilty of a crime punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, offered to
prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but
only after the court determines that the probative value
of admitting this evidence outweighs the danger of
unfair prejudice to the party against whom it is offered.
192. 985 S.W.2d 737 (Ark. 1999).
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In criminal cases the State may not offer evidence of a
judgment against a person other than the accused,
except for purposes of impeachment. The pendency of
an appeal may be shown but does not preclude
admissibility.
Committee note: This rule does not affect Rule 5-609.
This rule is not intended to have any effect on a
statutory or common law requirement to show a prior
conviction as an element of proof or as required to
illuminate an offense or charge of a separate nature.
Emphasis is added where there is a substantive departure from the
federal rule.
Issues raised by the admissibility of evidence through this hearsay
exception will have to withstand the tests identified in the language of
the rule. The party against whom the evidence is offered will have had
opportunity and motivation to fully litigate the issues. The issues will
have been necessary to the antecedent proceeding and based on a
conviction, will have necessarily been litigated. The standard of proof
is higher in the prior proceeding. Relevancy is weighed against
prejudicial effect. The party against whom it is offered has the
opportunity to explain or rebut the implications of the evidence. The
proposed rule expresses confidence in criminal judgments and
reinforces the integrity of the fact-finding process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Case law in Maryland precludes the admissibility of a criminal
conviction, as a hearsay exception, as substantive evidence of the facts
necessary to sustain the conviction in a subsequent civil trial. This
position is out of step with federal courts and three-quarters of the
other states that recognize a hearsay exception under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(22) or similar rules. Legitimate concerns exist in
finding a balance between the concept of fairness to the plaintiff
injured by a criminal activity and protection of a defendant's right to a
proceeding untainted by overtly prejudicial evidence.
The rationale expressed in the case law and the concerns of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland raised during earlier rules adoption
proceedings may be addressed by adopting a modified version of the
federal rule. The logical underpinning of the slayer's rule, holding
that the convicted defendant should not subsequently be able to profit
from his crime, argues for an expansion of the rule. The standards
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required for evaluating appropriate use of collateral estoppel, if
utilized by analogy, when weighing the admissibility of a prior
conviction, help to insure that the evidence is of value.

